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The "Cartesian Meditations" translation is based primarily on the printed text, edited by Professor S. Strasser and published in the first volume of Husserliana: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrage, ISBN 90-247-0214-3. Most of Husserl's emendations, as given in the Appendix to that volume, have been treated as if they were part of the text. The others have beeThe "Cartesian Meditations" translation is based primarily on the printed text, edited by Professor S. Strasser and published in the first volume of Husserliana: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrage, ISBN 90-247-0214-3. Most of Husserl's emendations, as given in the Appendix to that volume, have been treated as if they were part of the text. The others have been translated in footnotes. Secondary consideration has been given to a typescript (cited as "Typescript C") on which Husserl wrote in 1933: "Cartes. Meditationen / Original text 1929 / E. Husserl / fur Dorion Cairns." Its use of emphasis and quotation marks conforms more closely to Husserl's practice, as exemplified in works published during his lifetime. In this respect the translation usually follows Typescript C. Moreover, some of the variant readings n this typescript are preferable and have been used as the basis for the translation. Where that is the case, the published text is given or translated in a footnote. The published text and Typescript C have been compared with the French translation by Gabrielle Pfeiffer and Emmanuel Levinas (Paris, Armand Collin, 1931). The use of emphasis and quotation marks in the French translation corresponds more closely to that in Typescript C than to that in the published text. Often, where the wording of the published text and that of Typescript C differ, the French translation indicates that it was based on a text that corresponded more closely to one or the other - usually to Typescript C. In such cases the French translation has been quoted or cited in a foornote."...

Title : Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology
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Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology Reviews

  • Jonathan
    2018-11-30 22:50

    A pdf can be found online here:**************Some comments and thoughts noted down as I go, primarily as a way of keeping track of them for myself, but also to see what someone who has never studied philosophy but has read a bit of Heidegger, Descartes, Kant etc over the years, can get out of this text. 1. The introduction is surprisingly clear – the importance of Descartes is the stripping back to first principles, the process of doing philosophy being an individual task whereby we must each try and cut back the thicket of assumptions and find some sort of first principle to work up from - “they draw the prototype for any beginning philosopher's necessary meditations, the meditations out of which alone a philosophy can grow originally. “2. ” Descartes, in fact, inaugurates an entirely new kind of philosophy. Changing its total style, philosophy takes a radical turn: from naive Objectivism to transcendental subjectivism which, with its ever new but always inadequate attempts, seems to be striving toward some necessary final form, wherein its true sense and that of the radical transmutation itself might become disclosed. Should not this continuing tendency imply an eternal significance and, for us, a task imposed by history itself, a great task in which we are all summoned to collaborate?”3. What this ground is, and whether or not it is even possible to actually get to such a position, is debatable.4. “Along that way we now intend to walk together. In a quasi-Cartesian fashion we intend, as radically beginning philosophers, to carry out meditations with the utmost critical precaution and a readiness for any even the most far-reaching transformation of the old-Cartesian meditations. Seductive aberrations, into which Descartes and later thinkers strayed, will have to be clarified and avoided as we pursue our course.”First Meditation5. To presuppose logic as a method to get beyond presuppositions is obviously flawed. 6. ”Only we must be careful about how we make an absolute grounding of science our aim. At first we must not presuppose even its possibility.” 7. But, as you can’t get anywhere without making certain assumptions about the scientific method, we have to make preliminary, hesitant and open to change, presumptions in order to start our investigations. Which seems to me a bit of a cop-out, but anyway...8. So if we “do” science thinking, scientific theorising, we get a sense of what it is aiming at, even if there may be problems with the processes used etc 9. Contrast “immediate” and “mediate” judgments – Mediate judgments rely on the presupposition of other judgments to get to them – i.e. you have to already believe A in order to believe B – my question here would be if there could ever be any judgment that was not mediate...10. “grounded” judgments – how we establish something as “true”. “In a genuine grounding, judgments show themselves as "correct", as "agreeing"; that is to say, the grounding is an agreement of the judgment with the judged state of affairs [Urteilsverhalt] (the affair or affair-complex [Sackverhalf) "itself". “ So the “state of affairs” is something we have within and present to us, un-mediated? What does it mean to say the judger “possesses” a state of affairs? 11. So the scientific method, which wishes to ground itself on evidence, is the same as the Cartesian method, which similarly seeks to ground itself. 12. ” Evidence is, in an extremely broad sense, an "experiencing" of something that is, and is thus ; it is precisely a mental seeing of something itself.”- what is “something itself”? Is he suggesting that a “mental” seeing of something can possibly be immediate? Or is not always already completely saturated with all sorts of pre-existing crap? 13. Science wants to find truths that are for everyone and for all time, so its “truths” can happily keep changing and evolving without losing the goal of “truth”. There is a line of advance. Just like there should be in philosophy – it is a doing, not a dogma14. “we have gained a measure of clarity sufficient to let us fix, for our whole further procedure, a first methodological principle. It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from "experiences" in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as "they themselves". Indeed, even then I must at all times reflect on the pertinent evidence ; I must examine its "range" and make evident to myself how far that evidence, how far its "perfection", the actual giving of the affairs themselves, extends. Where this is still wanting, I must not claim any final validity, but must account my judgment as, at best, a possible intermediate stage on the way to final validity.”15. But if they are never present as “they themselves”, if there is no such thing as “they themselves”, then you are fucked Mr Husserl.16. " The phrase absolute certainty and the equivalent phrase absolute indubitability need clarifying. " - indeed they do!"an infectedness of the experience" with unfulfilled components, with expectant and attendant meanings."- Yes. 17. Just had to google "apodicity". - "capable of demonstration" - I think this para means that such certainty of the truth evidence is not just that it is, but that it is inconceivable that it would not be. 18. If we can know that certain evidence is not grounded, the possibility of evidence that would be grounded would be recognizable. So, seeing it is not X still gives us hints as to X. 19. The existence of the world - " The being of the world, by reason of the evidence of natural experience, must no longer be for us an obvious matter of fact; it too must be for us, henceforth, only an acceptance-phenomenon."- so, there is no ground and nowhere to start from...unless we do the turn that Descartes did...20. "In short, not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that is."But this phenomenon itself is not nothing, it is clearly something. Even if you decided not to believe in anything you experienced, that "not believing" would still be something. There is an Ego grasping all this "immediately". (hmmmm...)21. So if you cut out everything, you end up at "pure living", "pure experiencing"22 " By my living, by my experiencing, thinking, valuing, and acting, I can enter no world other than the one that gets its sense and acceptance or status [Sinn und Geltung]in and from me, myself."So Ego comes before World.23. But, yes, the issue is - can the experiencing of the transcendental self be apodictic? What about the past, memory as components of that self? Can they not be doubted? But we can still separate the "lived present", the experiencing of something now, being such a ground. But how far does this extend? Clearly this is an uncertain ground, and indeterminate ground. 24. Ah. Ok. So Descartes' mistake was to turn round at this point and start building back up - what we should do is stay in this position of radical uncertainty and stay true to our requirement for "evidence". 25. So the "Objective" world is irrelevant, and not something we should be attempting to inquire into or ascertain. The "reduced", or radically questioned, "Ego" is not part of the World. We are "not-really-included". So therefore our subject should always simply be what the experiencing of the me doing the philosophical investigation is... Second MeditationOk. Now things are stepping up a gear. We have to stay where we are – in the thinking of being. Transcendental experience [groooovy maaan]. But the problem of “evidence”, of “grounding” remains. However – “The bare identity of the "I am" is not the only thing given as indubitable in transcendental self-experience. Rather there extends through all the particular data of actual and possible self-experience - even though they are not absolutely indubitable in respect of single details - a universal apodictically experienceable structure of the Ego ”. So we need to explore this realm, but it is, of course, mine and mine only, there is no assumption of universal applicability. But don’t be scared kids, Husserl is dangling the tantalising prospect of something more than just solipsism in front of us... So, we focus on the “flowing” conscious life of the Ego – I like that he says “flowing”, as I think it vital to see this a process (Bergson). STOP THE PRESS!! THIS AINT PSYCOLOGY, ALRIGHT?! Don’t even go there. We are not interested in anthropological investigations into our species’ interior life, but to the consequences of that reduction down to the experiencing Ego. You can’t collate data about a patient’s thoughts when you have to doubt the truth both of the data and the patient. Yes. Consciousness is always “consciousness-of” – it is always directed at something. And also we must note the difference between simply perceiving something, and also being aware of the fact of our perceiving (and also remembering that we have bracketed off the existence of the thing being perceived). So we have a split Ego – one “interested” in the world, the other “a disinterested onlooker”. But do we not immediately get into a problem of infinite regress here Husserl? Will the Ego not keep splitting forever? Where is this “final” onlooker? Noematic (the perceived intentional object) –v- Noetic (the processes of perception). When we look at something - ” we find the feature in question as a unity belonging to a passing flow of "multiplicities"”. These multiplicities include the Noematic and the noetic. We can direct our intentionality at the object in different ways to emphasise different aspects of it, but these are never isolated from each other, or separated. These structures can be described, or investigated. This includes, for example, the fact that when I observe the computer in front of me, the object includes all sorts of other stuff which is "invisible" - not just the innards of the computer but, i guess, also all its Computer-ness. ”One most general trait, however, is always present in any consciousness of any sort, as consciousness of something: This something, the particular "intentional object qua intentional" in any consciousness, is there [bewusst] as an identical unity belonging to noetically-noematically changing modes of consciousness, whether intuitive or non-intuitive. “ These ”facts of synthetic structure” are what we can investigate with phenomenology. “Identification” – time – differentiate between the temporality in which an object appears and the temporality of my observing of it. And this synthesis that is the internal object appearing in my consciousness is something that escapes the bracketing off we have done. The horizon of possibility around our interpretation of an object is delineated, is not infinite. There are only a certain number of ways we can experience or think through an object, and these are in place from the start. So, even though the modes of consciousness of the object change, they do so within a limit. And we can investigate this limit. This issue is therefore not the investigation of the elements of something, but of potentialities. Then there are lots of words that set off Heidegger triggers for me here – “"explication" or "unfolding", a "becoming distinct" and perhaps a "clearing"” The "intentional object" as clue...he seems to be into categories here, but I may be misunderstanding...we can ascertain certain "structural types" and group these together to get the transcendental constitution of any object (but how can we be dealing with categories if everything is in flux?)Any "Objective" object, any object whatever (even an immanent one), points to a structure, within the transcendental ego, that is governed by a rule." There may be flux, then, but it is not chaotic. There are rules. And our task as phenomenological investigators is to uncover them. (seems like he makes some big jumps to get us here, but it may be I am missing something). Third Meditation A short one this, but that doesn’t mean it is easy. Getting a concept pregnant is never easy. ”By epoch we effect a reduction to our pure meaning (cogito) and to the meant, purely as meant. ““the multiplicities of modes of consciousness that belong together synthetically and pertain to any meant object, of no matter what category, can be explored as to their phenomenological types.”“Reason is not an accidental de facto ability, not a title for possible accidental matters of fact, but rather a title for an all-embracing essentially necessary structural form belonging to all transcendental subjectivity. “ And now we come to his attempt to deal with the problem of “evidence” – it is, apparently, “self-exhibiting” of a state-of-affairs. Something experienced directly (?) So we can ask how the object in our consciousness conforms with how such an object would have to appear “in itself” – I am not sure I understand this. Is it the sort of thing like seeing the bottle in front of me, and having therefore certain expectations about it as an object, which are then confirmed (or contradicted) when i pick it up/look at it from the other side etc? Phantasy/imagined objects –v- actual - it doesn't matter, the process is the same even if a hallucination. We are still directed towards a "thing". The horizon of possible evidences – verification (opening up the computer to see what is inside changing my experience of the object – though I retain both the old and the new – temporality – it is always the object, but its “meaning” is in flux, in flow) - a "context" for things (is this like Heidegger's "background"?) Synthesis gives us our reality. Synthesis is temporal.Fourth Meditation1. What makes up, what is the structure, of the actual or possible consciousness of Objects? ”Each object that the ego ever means, thinks of, values, deals with, likewise each that he ever phantasies or can phantasy, indicates its correlative system and exists only as itself the correlate of its system.” So we follow the way that is indicated...2. Yes – how does one reconcile the “flowing” consciousness with the sense of a static, permanent “I”? Well, firstly be recognising it is not static – that the I constantly changes, but is “constituted” as though it were “fixed and abiding” – temporality again. 3. Monad = “the Ego taken in full concreteness” – the totality of ego-cogito-cogitatum - habituities etc – what makes me experience myself as me – “ I exist for myself and am continually given to myself, by experiential evidence, as " myself" . This is true of the transcendental ego and, correspondingly, of the psychologically pure ego; it is true, moreover, with respect to any sense of the word ego. Since the monadically concrete ego includes also the whole of actual and potential conscious life, it is clear that the problem of explicating this monadic ego phenomenologically (the problem of his constitution for himself) must include all constitutional problems without exception. Consequently the phenomenology of this self-constitution coincides with phenomenology as a whole.”4. ”By the method of transcendental reduction each of us, as Cartesian meditator, was led back to his transcendental ego naturally with its concrete-monadic contents as this de facto ego, the one and only absolute ego. When I keep on meditating, I, as this ego, find descriptively formulable, intentionally explicatable types; and I was able to progress step by step in the intentional uncovering of my "monad” along the fundamental lines that offer themselves.”5. So – try looking at a table, and then start imagining it as a different colour, shape etc – so in the real of the “as-if”, but are still “perceiving” - by removing “the real” from this, we can get to “perception” as an “ideal” – something prior to all “concepts” etc, something universal – the perception-ness of perception - this is the eidetic method. 6. So, we can eventually uncover all the “ideal” versions of these ego-concepts (which, synthesised, make up the ego) and so get to the transcendental ego, the “ideal” ego embracing all possible variants. Eidetic phenomenology – vary all you can until you are left with what cannot be varied without the concept/object being something different - "The eidos itself is a beheld or beholdable universal, one that is pure, " unconditioned" that is to say: according to its own intuitional sense, a universal not conditioned by any fact. It is prior to all "concepts", in the sense of verbal significations; indeed, as pure concepts, these must be made to fit the eidos."7. I am not sure I agree with Husserl here - I don't think such ideal essences exist - what about language, what about the world, our bodies and all the other stuff that continually forms part of whatever is going on in us - I don't think I agree that there is some sort of untainted concept out there that we can get to.8. The universal flux – temporality again -” past, present, and future, become unitarily constituted over and over again, in a certain noetic-noematic formal structure of flowing modes of givenness.”“the ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a ' 'history".”The frame of laws inherent in such a unity. Habit. Society. That transcendental phenomenology will allow us to get over even this. Active –v- passive genesis (in respect of the Ego) – i.e. active is constitutive (e.g. reason), passive being the beforehand, the already... “In any case, anything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity that gives something beforehand; and, when we trace anything built actively, we run into constitution by passive generation. The "ready-made" object that confronts us in life as an existent mere physical thing (when we disregard all the "spiritual" or "cultural" characteristics that make it knowable as, for example, a hammer, a table, an aesthetic creation) is given, with the originality of the "it itself", in the synthesis of a passive experience. As such a thing, it is given beforehand to "spiritual" activities, which begin with active grasping.” We learn this. So there is a history, we can point backward to the giving of the beforehand of an Object. We became-acquainted-with. Without this history there could be no Objects. We call this process “association”. 9. “Association, it should be clearly noted, is a matter of intentionality, descriptively demonstrable as that, in respect of its primal forms, and standing, in respect of its intentional performances, under eidetic laws. Owing to these, each and every passive constitution is to be made understandable both the constitution of subjective processes, as objects in immanent time, and the constitution of all real natural objects belonging to the Objective spatio-temporal world. Association is a fundamental concept belonging to transcendental phenomenology.” “[Association] designates a realm of the "innate" Apriori, without which an ego as such is unthinkable. “This concept is necessary in order to understand the nexus, the structure, the synthetic structure we are investigating. [Continued in the comments]

  • David M
    2018-11-18 21:03

    If the journey to the point of departure is so toilsome, it is because the concrete is the final conquest of thought - Paul Ricouer, Freud and PhilosophyRicoeur considered himself a humble student of Husserl, and I think the master would assent to the above. The original rallying cry of phenomenology was 'to the things themselves.' Nonetheless, when you read Husserl it's hard to avoid feeling the concrete has been endlessly deferred. He spends so much time on his precious reduction, which must be carried out laboriously over and over again. At the same time it's true that what I care most about in philosophy grows more or less directly out of Husserl. Speaking of my own personal triumvirate, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, and Ricoeur would all be inconceivable without Husserl. (Happily, in Phenomenology of Perception, M-P makes short work of the reduction, dispensing with it by the end of the preface.) Phenomenology greatly expands the areas of human experience amenable to rigorous philosophical investigation. This is true even if Husserl himself stayed within a fairly limited framework of epistemological questions.I took a few notes as I read this book:*"That the being of the world 'transcends' consciousness ... and that it necessarily remain transcendent, in no wise alters the fact that it is conscious life alone wherein everything transcendent becomes constituted" - pp 62As I think this passage indicates, there's no getting around the enormous amount of tension internal to Husserl. Reading secondary literature you'll notice incredible disagreement about basic aspects of his philosophy. For instance, was he a strict realist or radical idealist? Possibly he was just more scrupulous and honest than most everyone else. Where most other philosophers find a need take a stance on basic issues in order to then formulate their own doctrine, Husserl was constantly circling back to reopen old wounds. *"The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to another merely exterenally by a rigid law, is nonsensical" - pp 84For much of Husserl's career, neo-Kantianism was the main philosophical rival to phenomenology. This passage can be read as a swipe at the Kantian thing-in-itself or noumenal realm. In Husserl's view, Kant constructed obscure concepts where what was needed was a more rigorous clarification of the content of experience. *page 97 - discussion of kinesthetic sensation and the 'I can' - this would be the starting point for Merleau-Ponty; where Husserl keeps bumping into the body almost accidentally, always from the perspective of the ego, M-P would make the body the explicit theme of his own investigations right from the beginning*Okay, here's where he gets Leibnizian: "the constitution of the world essentially involves a 'harmony' of the monads" (pp 108), but then he quickly goes on to say he's not making anything up: "This is not meant, however, as a 'metaphysical' hypothesizing of monadic harmony, any more than the monads themselves are metaphysical inventions or hypotheses" (ibid). Even when he starts to stray into the wildly metaphysical territory of Leibniz, Husserl insists that phenomenology remains a kind of empiricism, a patient description or explication of the phenomena of experience. Yet one may wonder whether he's barking up the wrong tree by looking to consciousness for the foundations of the objective and cultural world. *Section 55, pages 120 to 128 - alright, now things are getting realllllly complicated. Husserl wishes to show that I do not infer the existence of another based on external evidence, as Descartes and the classic empiricists would claim, but that I apprehend the other directly as another - "What I actually see is not a sign and not a mere analogue, a depiction in the natural sense of the world; on the contrary, it is someone else" (pp 124)And yet Husserl remains committed to showing how the other is constituted in me. Later on, arguably, this would change as the 'lifeworld' became a prominent category in his thought, but for the Cartesian Meditations he is unabashedly committed to a philosophy of the ego. The apotheosis of the ego, but also maybe the point at which the ego is pushed to the fucking brink.Scholastic philosophers complained that Descartes asked some really silly questions, and indeed who could say there were wrong. Solipsism is an artificial problem that only arises once you've committed to a certain type of ego-centric philosophizing. It seems unlikely there has ever been a totally consistent solipsist in the history of humanity (even extreme cases of autism or sociopathy really are not the same thing). Nonetheless, since Descartes it has been a problem to which philosophers must return obsessively. *Wheew, relatively smooth sailing after that; the term 'life-world' comes up on page 134, but Husserl still seems to restrict its application. Like everything else, it ultimately derives its sense from the ego.

  • Nathan
    2018-11-19 21:07

    A quick revisit to the Fifth Meditation this time around. In the Fifth Meditation Husserl staves off the threat of the accusation that transcendental-phenomenology is a solipsism. I think he succeeds, or at a minimum, provides the path from the solus ipse of the transcendentally reduced ego to the intersubjective/objective world of the positive sciences and the establishment of an interpretation of the sense-intention of ‘the being of the other.’ But overall, Heidegger’s treatment (forgive me for not having the precise relationship between the Fifth and SuZ ready-to-hand) of these issues in Sein und Zeit is either superior, more thorough-going, more accessible, or simply more familiar to me.For initiating oneself into the world of Husserl’s texts I can quite easily recommend these Cartesian Meditations (an expansion of a pair of lectures delivered at the Sorbonne, and thus introductory) as a first. The problems, however, are dense. One might do well to just dig into the Logical Investigations first. On the other hand, if you have no idea what intentionality, apodicticity, etc mean, ie, have no acquaintance with phenomenology in the precise Husserlian sense, then please do not start by reading one of his books. What one requires first is an orientation as to what phenomenology as a descriptive science is all about. For this reason, my standard recommendation is three fold ::Introduction to Phenomenology -- for an historical overview of the main thinkers and the phenomenological/philosophical questions they pursue. The Phenomenology Reader -- for a first brush with phenomenological thinking itself.Introduction to Phenomenology -- for a practical introduction to the methodology of phenomenology and how it works as a descriptive science ; and also, how you can make phenomenology relevant to your daily life![doubtless there are other fine introductory volumes]All three are relatively easy-reading for a reader with a basic philosophical/intellectual/scientific/curiosity background.

  • the gift
    2018-12-05 18:59

    this is a much later later addition: after reading some reviews of works of philosophy, i will try to 'do' philosophy, that is, ask questions, search, always be open to discussion, for i think i have by now read enough philosophy for this to be possible and fruiful. (new years decision) and what if hs is mistaken? what if consciousness is not always '-of'? from looking at the several reviews by my efriends, from looking at all the phenomenology read, this could be a major, essential, inevitable flaw- i think there is already the apparent difficulty in positing a unified ego, a self, as a cause rather than effect, of evidence given of the world, or rather 'constructed/constructing' the world. this may be deleuze talking. certainly as i now am reading much various strands of 'indian' philosophy, there is the idea our ego/world is more than continuum of sensory/conceptual moments like beads on a string. there is the idea the string is real. the string is 'i', perhaps in the sense of m-p 'i can', rather than descartes's doubtful 'i' or empiricist 'fictions' of 'i' as somehow preceding, removed, independent from the world we can sense as 'always already there'...this is a much later addition (4 years): after having read husserl's last big book, 'crisis of european sciences and transcendental phenomenology'... it is much longer but actually i found it easier to read, though part of that is having read a lot of and on husserl eg. in these meditations. i would rec that book before this if you do not mind length... first review: read this concurrently with a d smith’s guide, which is a good idea. i am not studying it. each meditation is very concise, perhaps too much so. got the idea husserl was tightening up a whole range of ideas in order to shorten the book, this works but the guide is very helpful. the first few meditations are related to descartes but happily you do not need to go back and read him. description of this new science of phenomenology is inspiring, as it takes as source, data, logic, to be that immediate and essential experience of each our own subjective consciousness. the idea that our minds, our mind alone, can be explored objectively as subjective and everything makes sense… aspirations to scientific rigor of logic and unquestionable evidence, kind of romantic, kind of tragic, never fully met. i do not know how well husserl avoids solipsism, the major concern of the last meditation, how his monadology is inflected by windows and this somehow makes intersubjectivity the defining nature of subjectivity. we need others to be ourselves, i think he is saying. i do not know. i am convinced to read more of husserl- as this is in his terms, only the beginning…

  • Roy Lotz
    2018-12-14 17:59

    The Germans have a fascinating culture. Even in translation, I can often tell whether a thinker is German from the particular style of prose, the manner of argument, and the types of priorities of the thinker. This mysterious Deutsch-Stil has had an enormous influence on the intellectual life of the West, and now it seems that many contemporary French and American intellectuals (though the English seem particularly resilient to it) self-consciously try to emulate the style of German philosophy in translation. The consequence for prose has been disastrous, if you ask me. But this is a review of Husserl after all, so enough of these musings!It is slightly odd that Edmund Husserl is so little read relative to other thinkers of the previous century, such as Heidegger, Sartre, and Russell. Within the philosophic tradition Husserl was enormously influential, but it seems he lacks ‘cross-over’ appeal. It’s a bit of a shame. Trying to understand Heidegger without some idea of Husserl is like trying to understanding Einstein with no familiarity with Newton—the ‘revolutionary’ quality of Heidegger’s thinking makes no sense without this historical context.In my opinion, Husserl was a fantastic philosopher (and I would take this little book before Being and Time any day). True to the name of this work, Husserl is working firmly within the Cartesian tradition. Like Descartes, he starts off by doubting everything that can be doubted and, like Descartes, he gets down to his own ego. However, from that point on, his philosophy differs markedly. Descartes, after affirming his own existence, turns to scholastic logical proofs to rebuild the exterior world. Husserl, instead, brackets the world, following through with the impetus that Descartes abandoned after the first step.Husserl ends up with a philosophy that is remarkably similar to cognitive psychology in some ways, but differing in its profoundly introspective orientation. He examines his consciousness in extreme detail, interrogating various processes that normally operate in the background, and bringing them to the fore. He takes the best ideas from Kant, Hegel, Locke, Descartes, and Leibniz, weaves them into a coherent whole, and ends up with a genuinely novel and compelling philosophical system. System is the key word here, as Husserl is, if anything, systematic, organized, and thorough. This book, although brief, is quite an intellectual chore to get through. His sentences display the usual German flair for longevity and prolixity, and he may set some sort of record for subordinate clauses.In spite of this, I quite enjoyed Husserl’s philosophy. It’s interesting in its own right, and provides a tremendous insight into the philosophy of his pupil, Martin Heidegger. And, for what it’s worth, if I was asked to take sides in the disagreement between these two monumental thinkers, I would be wearing a Husserl uniform.

  • Ali
    2018-12-05 23:16

    فوق العاده بود . فقط همینو می تونم بگم . خیلی وقت بود می خواستم بخونمش پا نمیداد . امروز یهو گرفتمو یه نفس خوندمش تا آخر . مشخصا برا فمهمیدن همچین اثری یک بار خوندن کمه و اونم یک روزه خوندن ، سعی دارم حداقل دو بار دیگه برای فهم بهتر بخونمش . به طور کلی خیلی از ریشه های فلسفه هستی و زمان هیدگر رو به راحتی میشه درش دید و همچنان عقیده ی منو محکمتر کرد بر این موضوع که آلمانی ها در برابر اسلافشون اگر نه فروتن و خاضع ، خیلی پیگیر و جدی ان و واقعا میشه از وجود یه کسی مث هوسرل انتظار به وجود اومدن فیلسوفی مثل هیدگر رو داشت ، همون قدر که از وجود آتیش ، دود رو ! پنج فصل یا به اصطلاح مترجم «عبدالکریم رشیدیان» پنج تامل داره ، در تامل اول هوسرل به طور کلی اندیشه ی دکارت رو تبیین و تشریح می کنه ، در کل هوسرل به این معتقده که در جمله معروف دکارت یعنی : Cogito Ergo Sum - می اندیشم ، پس هستم - ، دکارت دچار یه خطای منطقی شده و اون اینه که اون پیش از اینکه از هستن بوسیله ی «من هستم» آگاه بشه می بایست برای خودش وجود یک اندیشنده ای رو که داره به این هستی فکر می کنه رو مدنظر قرار بده . بعد به تفکیک عناصر متشکله ی جمله مشغول میشه و می گه باشنده یا همون Cogitatum ، اگو و cogito یا اندیشه هر کدومشون بر یه محمل فرود میان و اون چیزی نیس غیر از اون چیزی که در جا هست به عبارت دیگه همون Das Sein هیدگر که بعدا شکل اصلی و قوام یافته ش رو پیدا می کنه . یادم نمیاد فصلای بعدی راجب چی بود ،اما فصل چهارم در حقیقت ، انقلاب فرسفی قرن بیستم رو به وضوح نشون میده .در فصل دوم و سوم «خود» و «دیگری» رو به شکل کامل و کافی می شناسونه و در فصل چهارم ، اون ارتباط این دو رو با هم بررسی می کنه . پیش از هوسرل برنتانو به حوزه ی تداخل حوزه های من و دیگری در جواهر یا همون مونادها - البته از نوع لایب نیتسی - پرداخته بود ولی هوسرل در حقیقت حرفای ناواضح برنتانو رو به طور واضح تشریح می کنه ، ضمن اینکه با گذشت زمان مناسبی از تالیف این کتاب ، این حرف ها دیگه فقط یه فلسفیدن محض نیست ، بلکه میتونه آبشخور اندیشه های وحشتناکی بشه که امروز به طور عاجزانه ای دنبال یه تعریف و تفسیر جدید می گرده . در انتها ، تامل پنجم ، هوسرل با رد علم عملی و ایمان آزمایشگاهی منکر هر نوع احاطه ی علم بر وجود خودش میشه ، یه جورایی مث آدورنو ، به طور غیر مستقیم میگه که علم ، موضوع خودشه و در حقیقت بدون این باز آغازی که از ابتدا به روش دکارتی به تمام باشنده ها شک کنیم ولی مثل دکارت خودمون رو با علم و ابزار مدرن فریب ندیم ، چاره ای برامون نمونده . پاراگراف های انتهای کتاب بعد از گفتن این جمله ها ، دچار یه نوع احتیاط توام با احترام نسبت به دین و فرهنگ میشه و هوسرل گرچه تایید میکنه که در این زمینه ها سوالات مطرح شده تا امروز بیهوده و پوچ بودن اما خود موضوعات ، موضوعات پوچی نبودن و لازمه بشر باز به اونا بپردازه . کتاب با یه جمله ازسنت اگوستین تموم میشه که البته فک می کنم پیشتر از این جایی به اسم کنفوسیوس هم خونده بودمش : خودت را بشناس ...

  • Greg
    2018-12-02 17:48

    I don't remember this book very well, but it was the basis for a class that I also can't really remember the name of. What I do remember is that this book is about eighty pages or something like that and that it cost sixty something dollars.

  • Alex Obrigewitsch
    2018-11-24 22:47

    Husserl's Cartesian Meditations is not only an important turning point in Husserl's conception of phenomenology, but also in the history of phenomenology as a philosophical method, style, or movement, as it ostracized the founder of phenomenology from many of his disciples who, having been enamoured with the possibilities of phenomenology as laid out in the Logical Investigations, could not follow the thought down the path of transcendental idealism by way of the transcendental ego. The relations of my own thought to that of Husserl are highly conflicted. I owe much to Heidegger, one of Husserl's prominent early disciples. Of course, it is to the Heidegger who was disillusioned with this turn in Husserl's thought, the Heidegger critical to and wary of talk of consciousness and all of its imbedded metaphysical conceptions and presuppositions, that I owe much regard. Like Heidegger, I can find interest and inspiration in the thought of the Logical Investigations, but with the idealist turn of the Cartesian Meditations I am put off by Husserl and the inanities of his persistent rationalism, as well as his blatant disregard for existence (evinced by the transcendental reduction) in favor of the objects of consciousness alone. Husserl fails to see that the "thing itself" cannot be grasped by consciousness, that it only captures a fraction of existence. Consciousness comprehends only the subjective aspect of being, and through the transcendental element perhaps the objective aspect as well (by way of the eidos). But the subject-object system of relations remains merely a conceptual construct, a conscious framework for experience. Consciousness is not the whole of human existence - it remains but a fragment, rooted in metaphysical ficticity.Another of my fundamental problems with Husserl's thought in the Cartesian Meditations is akin to Derrida's issue with Husserl - it comes down to his idea of the ego or self as continually present and directly given to itself. Are we not founded upon an abyss, inundated with absence? Our concepts, our meanings, the world and all objects in the subject-object polarity relation, all of these things founded in and by the ego qua transcendental egoity, are they not grounded in and through abstraction - abstraction being an absence and a loss insofar as it produces a present gain in ideality? And then there is the ungraspable to-come which ever haunts us, reaching back into an anterior past that was never present - how is this absence that is given to the self to be comprehended as meaningful presence, to be integrated into the ego and the world of totality? We are never fully present to ourselves, even in thought. Husserl neglects to acknowledge this, focusing only on consciousness to found his system of thought. Husserl continually sets himself up to discover only what he seeks to find, disregarding what eludes conscious understanding - but such a piecemeal thought cannot stand as a utilizable foundation for any science or knowledge.In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl seeks to "reawaken the impulse of the Cartesian Meditations: not to adapt their content but, in not doing so, to renew with greater intensity the radicalness of their spirit" (6). That is to say, Husserl seeks to, like Descartes, found science and knowledge upon the ego cogito, albeit through a different method, this being the phenomenological method. But no matter how radical Husserl perceives his thought as being, it remains rooted in the same faulty foundations as the meditations of Descartes - namely, the subject-object distinction and the attempt to found everything in and through the subject, which cannot but remain a vestige of abstracted existence - that is to say, in a fiction and a nothing - utterly unworkable as an absolute founding principle. Put differently, Husserl's thought is not radical enough. How can one found science, a knowledge base, or anything for that matter, on nothing, in a groundless abyss? This is a fundamental question and problem of our existence which the Cartesian Meditations opens up, but ultimately fails to adequately address with its reason and its answers; the question ruptures and exceeds the capacities of reason. This fundamental problem is one which subject-object polarized thinking cannot manage, order, or reconcile. This mode of thinking, so pervasive historically up until the last century or so, fails of necessity, fated to drown in the sea of existence's boundless differences, its abyssal possibilities, its intractable motions and ruptures of which it cannot get a purchase. Rooted in the concept as well as in presence, paradoxical to its core, it cannot grasp the alterity of existence's differential flows, which flourish and proliferate through each and every singular life. Husserl never even considers that existence, outside the limits of sense, might be nonsensical, that is, otherwise than rational, and that this too demands to be thought.The fifth meditation is the breaking point of the work, where the thought falls apart before our very eyes, evincing the fundamental failure inherent, though perhaps not adequately grasped, in the whole of the preceding parts. It has ever been the contentious point of much discussion concerning the Cartesian Meditations. Husserl finds himself hung up due to his subject-object relational thinking when he is confronted with the other. The other shatters the transcendental illusion. For even understood as objectified subject, subject-as-object, or alter-ego, this Other (note the capital distinction, signifying the concept of the other, the Other, which, paradoxically, as aspect of the ego, lacks all alterity or otherness; the Other is but the Same) lacks what makes the other other - their alterity, their singularity. All the conceptual, transcendental framework of Husserl's thought abstracts from and loses the otherto an empty concept. The Other, the alter-ego, is in the end a dead object; a puppet. The other can never be an alter-ego, a mirroring of my own self - this concept negates alterity in its grasping. The other can only appear as and through alterity, as absolutely other - as a void or hole in the world, a slip or blur in signification. The I and its world are shattered by the other; there is no "co-present" or "appresentation" of the other - this is but an illusion of transcendentiality. This co-presence of the other with myself would have to locate itself in a nowhere, a void or a blurring - in an absence. Is a co-presence so constituted by an absence a presence at all? What would be present here but an enigma? It is precisely as this enigma, this impossible question, that the other approaches us, in an immanence which transcendentalism cannot grasp, and always ends up losing. Of course, this is an approach to the problem of the other found in the fifth meditation from the side of my own thought. How does Husserl address, and in his opinion solve, this problem? Though Husserl finds that he can understand the being of the existent things (post reduction) by and through the eidos, he struggles to account for the other, who would appear to be another ego, which thus ruptures the transcendental constitution of the world through the ego that I am as self, as embodied expression of transcendental egoity. He attempts to understand the other through a vague and underdeveloped concept of empathy, and by thinking of the other as an alter-ego, an-other I. But, as I said before, this fails to grasp the radical difference of the other's alterity. The other, even if they are granted as being an ego, cannot be understood by me (the ego) as alter-ego. For the other is absolutely different than I am - there can be no grasping of the other's thought or existence. As Derrida writes in the seemingly tautological phrase that opens up the differential possibilities of language through the rupturing of logic (this statement is no tautology; rather than saying the same it attempts to speak of difference), "tout autre est tout autre;" "every other is completely other," as well as "the absolute other is expressed through every single other." To comprehend the other as alter-ego is to make them into an extension of the I, of myself - they are thus nothing but an illusory other, for they find their end in the Same (another of the Hegelian resonances that ring out throughout the thought of this text, which I have until this moment remained silent concerning), with all alterity committed to oblivion - much as Husserl disregards the exigency of existence with his transcendental reduction, refusing to think or admit anything outside of consciousness, relegating such an existence to the realm of nonsense (which for him is a highly pejorative term). But nonsense requires and demands to be thought through just as much as sense. The outside demands thought just as much, if not more than, interiority. The impossible must be thought alongside the possible, if the latter is to be rendered useful or meaningful. The close of the fifth meditation finds Husserl content, perhaps, with his solution to the problem of transcendental phenomenology as a solipsism - though his solution is hardly satisfying, seeming to be little more than a skirting around the issue of solipsism, rather than actually addressing it. It remains unsatisfactory because it fails to address the other at all, in that it only addresses the other in and through the ego, myself. "In me [the other] becomes constituted - appresentatively mirrored, not constituted as original" (149). How this understanding of the other, which understands nothing of the other (the "original" other; the other themselves), but only my own experience and concept of the Other, the other as reflection or shadow, could be satisfying to anyone approaching this problem remains beyond me. Certainly the shift in Husserl's thinking as expressed in his posthumously published writings would appear to speak to even Husserl's unease with the position posited in the Cartesian Meditations (this work too was not published in German until after his death).Transcendental idealism leads phenomenology down a dead end road; thus has it panned out historically that all of Husserl's disciples who turned away from his thought at the point of the Cartesian Meditations, when his thought took this idealist turn, turning away in attempts to radicalize phenomenology in a different manner, have managed to go beyond Husserl's thought (at least insofar as how it is expressed in this text). Though this work remains important in the history of phenomenology, and in the history of philosophy as a whole, it finds itself at an impasse as far as thought is concerned. Returning to the beginning of the work, we find that though Husserl sought to radicalize Cartesian philosophy by combining its methods with those of phenomenology, in the he has failed to escape the solipsistic fate of his predecessor; shipwrecked on the limits of his own skull, so to speak; the approach of the other, of any other, of any thing, being enough to bring the entire edifice of his well-wrought system of thought crashing down, fragmented into pieces, ever to remain irreparable and dead.

  • Steven Van Neste
    2018-11-29 00:16

    With his Cartesian Mediations Husserl offers a superb introduction into phenomenology and what we may call the hermeneutics of the real. Building upon the Cartesian cogito and meditations, Husserl offers us a new way of looking at reality and gives us the living world, an immediacy beyond the techno-scientific immediacy we are use to (themes which he furthermore worked out in his Crisis). More than anything however, Husserl’s Meditations show a strong influence of Leibniz’ Monadology, as the Cartesian ego finds transformation into the monad. It is especially through this use of the Monadology that Husserl anticipates Levinas’ post-phenomenology (note aswell that Levinas was one of the French translators of Husserl’s Meditations) except that for Husserl the ego always remains central, the way to the other, is for Husserl always because there is an essential sameness between the monads , the ego thus finds recognition of the other and as such the living world gives rise to the physical world.

  • Chris Black
    2018-12-06 16:56

    I see very little justification for any normative/prescriptive claims coming out of this text - any such claims would hinge on some naive optimism in humankind. The phenomenological reduction is interesting as a way of trying to think about things, but not much more. Also, on a readability note, if he is trying to get to "the things themselves" then why does he use such esoteric, ugly, and unnecessary language? (i.e. noetic/noematic, etc)Please, someone defend the Hustler, he dead so he can't defend himself.

  • Abdullah Başaran
    2018-12-07 18:04

    Bu adamın her kitabına Asıl Fenomenolojiye Giriş Bu Ulan alt-başlığını koyması harika ya, başka felsefede yaşayamam. Ama bence fenomenolojiye en karmaşık giriş (eğer öyle bir şey varsa) bu. Derli toplu, çetin, lakin karmaşık.

  • Sauli
    2018-11-21 23:00

    Either utterly incomprehensible or utterly wonderful. In any case, a foundational text, for better or for worse.

  • Dr. A
    2018-12-07 01:03

    ---Read this and reviews of other classics in Western Philosophy on the History page of (athinkPhilosophy Production).---Based on lectures that Edmund Husserl delivered at the Sorbone in 1929, the Cartesian Meditations establish Husserl’s methodology of (transcendental) phenomenology, arguably his most important contribution to Western Philosophy. The title of this work is a reference to Rene Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy and is a radical interpretation of Descartes' work. In his Cartesian Mediatations, Husserl develops the concepts of epoché (a radicalization of the skeptical reduction), a distinction between static versus genetic phenomenology, and the idea of an eidetic reduction and phenomenology. Husserl is the father of phenomenology, and while his writing is plodding and at times difficult to read (his work is based on lecture notes), his insights have proved revolutionary. For example, it is in response to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology that Martin Heidegger develops existential phenomenology, from which the existentialism movement takes its roots - see Heidegger’s Being and Time and Sartre’s Being and Nothingness.This work is a must read for readers interested in the Continental European tradition of Philosophy, as it is it’s starting point in the 20th Century. ---Read this and reviews of other classics in Western Philosophy on the History page of (athinkPhilosophy Production).---

  • Yonina
    2018-11-17 22:01

    Pleasantly difficult. Glad I've finally gotten a better grasp on Husserl. Much more influential on Sartre than I had imagined. I especially liked the footnotes about Husserl's marginalia, editing, and anxiety about the organization of his project (e.g. "does this bit come too late?" Yes, it probably does, but that's okay, Ed.)

  • Giorgi
    2018-11-20 00:01

    science of thinking how is it able to create phenomenology there are some kind of meditation about meditation and decartism .organisation of subject and object in mind make some kind of difference between something like it, but today no one thinking about thinking.

  • Scott Kleinpeter
    2018-11-18 20:15

    I typically do not include books here that I rate <4. But, I read this thing. And I'm glad I did. Even if I remember practically nothing about it. One of my professors said she flung it across her room.

  • Tijmen Lansdaal
    2018-12-05 21:57

    Though there can hardly be one sole introduction to Husserlian phenomenology, this comes the closest. The devilish magic of its prodigious methodology can sadly not be appreciated as fully as it might've been if it weren't haunted by its successors oh so badly (especially in the fifth meditation).

  • Jacopo Bertoli
    2018-11-24 18:48

    La filosofia ha coessenzialmente la capacità di rinnovarsi e di rinnovare i campi sui quali getta la sua luce. Una luce non illuministica, più una torcia da detective. Le cose della filosofia non stanno sotto la luce metallica museale, ad illuminare qualcosa che vogliamo mantenere così. Gli oggetti della filosofia stanno sul banco di un chirurgo, vanno costantemente sviscerati, ridotti ed esposti ad analisi. Ciò che troviamo in un museo è già confermato, preso così dallo spettatore per come esso di manifesta. Il chirurgo non guarda al mondo come essenzializzato, ne vuole scoprire le intime cause ed i processi trasformativi. Una buona filosofia allora deve essere sicuramente in buona parte fenomenologica (e qui sono già racchiuse idee di ontologia, gnoseologia, psicologia, etc.). Deve aprire la Carne del Mondo, ritornare all'ego trascendentale per dimostrare l'inevitabile e necessaria intersoggettività trascendentale. Husserl ha superato la crisi, ha rifondato un percorso millenario, ha dato luce a ciò che era da troppo in ombra, non scrutato. Se ora riusciamo a fare della buona filosofia, della buona antropologia, del buon pensiero critico, è grazie all'impegno fenomenologico.

  • Tinytim Timea
    2018-12-15 20:10

    Acum am înțeles! S-a dus Husserl drăguțul în vizită la frații francezi. Știți cum e: socializează intelectualitatea - mai o brânzică, mai un Loupiac, mai o nouă găselniță chimică de la Société de biologie (vorbim totuși de perioada interbelică)... I-au arătat ei francezii bietului Edmund cum e treaba cu trăirea și fenomenul. L-au dus în Amphithéâtre Descartes și bietul om a început să debiteze... Se mai întâmplă, mai ales dacă ești un matematician german harnic și conștiincios care pățește o întâlnire cu Franța... Eh, n-ar fi fost grav, că Edmund probabil și-a revenit după câteva ore bune de somn. Dar s-au gândit ei, vreo câțiva, că e un sens adânc în ce spune un intelectual neamț îmbibat cu alcool francez (de calitate alcool, fără îndoială) dacă îl lași să contemple măreția carteziană...Nu există o explicație mai bună pentru ”Meditațiile carteziene”, carte care de altfel nici măcar n-a apărut în germană cât timp Husserl trăia... Îl înțeleg, acasă la el probabil avea faimă de om serios...

  • Taleb Jaberi
    2018-11-26 22:53

    خواندن و فهمیدن ترجمه ی فارسی بسیار دشوار بود

  • Mason Kelso
    2018-12-02 20:13

    Intentionality is apparently everything... A real head-stretcher. Good, but dense.

  • Giorgi Komakhidze
    2018-12-01 20:49

    "Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say,<{means" something or other and bears in itself, in this mannerpeculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum. Each does this,moreover, in its own fashion. The house-perception means ahouse more precisely, as this individual house and meansit in the fashion peculiar to perception ; a house-memory meansa house in the fashion peculiar to memory; a house-phantasy,in the fashion peculiar to phantasy. A predicative judging abouta house, which perhaps is "there" perceptually, means it in justthe fashion peculiar to judging; a / valuing that supervenesmeans it in yet another fashion; and so forth. Conscious processesare also called intentional; but then the word intentionalitysignifies nothing else than this universal fundamental propertyof consciousness: to be consciousness of something; as a cogito,to bear within itself its cogitatum.""The path leading to a knowledge absolutelygrounded in the highest sense, or (this being the same thing) aphilosophical knowledge, is necessarily the path of universalself-knowledge first of all monadic, and then intermonadic.We can say also that a radical and universal continuation ofCartesian meditations, or (equivalently) a / universal selfcognition,is philosophy itself and encompasses all self-accountablescience."

  • Rhonda
    2018-11-17 16:56

    Fundamental to the understanding of phenomenology in general, especially to its proper growth in the 20th century, this book stands as a monument to critical thinking in an age where so many of the great men are largely forgotten. It amazes me that this book is a mark of the mature Husserl, appearing rather late in his life. It is, nevertheless, so easy to read as long as one realizes that he is standing in different perspectives of the same object, if you will, from chapter to chapter. This book is exemplary in giving the basis on which much of his phenomenology must be based, especially his non-psychology basis which he felt that Heidegger violated with the dasein.Historically, it was Frege who criticized phenomenology for being a psychologism and Husserl spent a great deal of his time defending exactly this. There can be little doubt that Husserl believed that Heidegger had taken the incorrect path with Sein und Zeit. Perhaps this, more so than the Nazi issue, caused the severe strain in their relationship.

  • Nathan
    2018-11-14 18:58

    I read this much much faster than I had originally intended, in the interest of time. I needed to understand this text because I was reading Totality and Infinite alongside it - and a lot of Levinas is in direct response to both Husserl and Heidegger. I got this gist of the text, but failed Husserl's expectation. What I read, I loved; and I feel bad for not giving it more time and more thought. But I will return to the text again when there is more time. When there is more time. This text requires close reading - very close reading - but what I understood, I absolutely loved. Husserl is not called the father of Phenomenology for nothing. Husserl is, quite literally, the father of phenomenology - and Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty are his children. And, like all children, they want to rebel against the father; but it is their destiny to be made in his image and likeness.

  • H Lamar
    2018-11-19 21:13

    Husserl is difficult. It took me a week to analyze a three page essay of his. Knowing and understanding Descartes and Spinoza are gateways to breaking open how Husserl thinks and sees the world. We are always coming from a position, laying our past on present knowledge, perhaps corrupting an image with incorrect relations, and this is how Phenomenology is brought into the world. His questions on Thinking made Heidegger and Derrida possible.Cartesian Meditations are for serious students of modern philosophy.

  • Sah Angoluan
    2018-12-05 19:49

    A very good book written by Husserl. A very systematic and as i see it is very absolute. His system regarding the 'I'is very concrete. Unlike Descartes who has influenced Husserl in this meditation, he has somewhat supported the ego or I in a very absolute manner, unlike Descartes that have left the mind and body dualism problem.

  • Xander Duffy
    2018-11-17 22:48

    I read an excerpt from this in first year, it was more like ploughing than reading, however once you get used to the style, it is very engaging and a respectful rebuttal to Descartes, and highly original.

  • Grant Francis
    2018-12-12 16:49

    Good effort

  • Aníbal Rivera Dávila
    2018-11-22 19:10

    Un libro estupendo. De una claridad meridiana, y reformador del pensamiento

  • Zakarie
    2018-11-26 22:56

    Husserl is a bitch ass; empathy is a cop-out.